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This paper investigates the determinants of the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual 
investors on the Australian Stock Exchange. Utilizing a proprietary data set that identifies 
institutional and individual order submissions, we document that the institutional and individual 
investors become more aggressive when the same-side (opposite-side) market depth increases 
(decreases). When the spread widens, both individual and institutional investors tend to become 
less aggressive. Institutional investors are more aggressive in the opening hour of the trading day, 
while individual investors are less aggressive initially and increase their order aggressiveness 
during the rest of the trading day. 
 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the factors determining the order aggressiveness of institutional 
and individual investors on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Utilizing a proprietary 
data set from the ASX that identifies institutional and individual order submissions, we 
examine the factors affecting the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual 
investors. We are particularly interested in the main differences between institutional 
and individual order placement strategies. 
 
We classify orders into different levels of aggressiveness by comparing the order price 
and order size to the price and market depth of the best quote (Biais et al., 1995). The 
investigation of investors' order aggressiveness is important for various reasons. First, 
according to Harris (1998), understanding the factors that affect order submission 
strategies (order aggressiveness) allows traders to optimize their trading strategies, 
which, in turn, will result in lower transaction costs and higher portfolio returns.  
 
Second, for the market as a whole, analyzing traders' order submission strategies will 
help determine the market conditions under which traders are willing to supply 
(submission of limit orders) and demand (placement of market orders) liquidity. This 
will improve our understanding of the price formation process (Ellul et al., 2007) and 
the fundamental issues of how order driven markets function (Bloomfield et al., 2005). 
The important role of limit order market as a form of security markets organization 
1provides further motivation for the research on order submission strategies of 
institutional and individual traders in the limit order market. The limit order book is 
also an important part of specialist and dealer markets such as the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ (see, among others, Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996; Chung et al., 1999; 
Bloomfield et al., 2005; Moulton, 2006; Hendershott and Moulton, 2008). 
                                                                        
1 Glosten (1994) provides the theoretical background for the importance of order driven markets. Jain (2003) 
documents that at the end of 1999,26 of the 51 stock markets in his study, were limit order markets. Virtually all of 
the stock markets in Europe are also organized as limit order markets (Handa et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
Prior literature often relies on the trade-off between the costs and benefits of using 
market and limit orders to explain the investors' order choice decision. The advantage 
of using market orders is the immediacy of the order execution, but it comes with the 
cost of paying higher execution prices. In contrast, limit orders provide price 
improvement over market orders, but are associated with the risk of non-execution.  
 
Moreover, since the limit price is fixed over time and monitoring might be costly, limit 
orders can become mispriced and thus may be executed at an unfavorable price. This is 
often referred to in the literature as the risk of being "picked-off" or "picking-off' risk.2 
Developing a one-tick dynamic model of a limit order market without asymmetric 
information, Parlour (1998) highlights that the decision to submit a market order or a 
limit order depends critically on the market depth on either side of the order book. 
Since this is a one-tick model, traders can submit a market order, can place a limit order 
which has lower time priority than existing limit orders, or choose not to trade.  
 
Therefore, execution probability of limit orders depends on the size of the book (market 
depth) and on the agent's belief about future order arrivals. Parlour (1998) shows that 
an increase in the buy-side (sell-side) market depth reduces the execution probability of 
buy (sell) limit orders and induces the incoming trader to submit a buy (sell) market 
order. Furthermore, sellers (buyers) also rationally anticipate the crowding out of limit 
orders on the buy (sell) side when the buy-side (sell-side) market depth increases. Thus, 
an increase in the buy-side (sell-side) market depth also makes limit sell (buy) orders 
more attractive than market sell (buy) orders. Consequently, there is a positive 
(negative) relation between same-side (opposite-side) market depth and order 
aggressiveness.3 
 
Foucault (1999) presents a model of a dynamic limit order market where investors 
differ in their valuations but not in their private information. Foucault (1999) suggests 
that higher volatility implies a greater "picking-off" risk for limit order submitters. Thus, 
limit order traders will demand a larger compensation for the higher "picking-off" risk, 
which in turn results in a wider spread and a higher cost of trading with market orders. 
Hence, the model predicts that the proportion of limit orders in the order flow is 
positively related to the price volatility and the bid-ask spread in limit order markets.4 
 
Empirical studies provide supportive evidence for the effect of spread and market depth 
on the investors' order aggressiveness in different markets and over different sample 
periods (see, for example, Biais et al., 1995; Griffiths et al., 2000; Ranaldo, 2004; Beber 
                                                                        
2 Aitken et al. (2007a) suggest that "picking-off" risk has a different impact for different groups of investors. The 
authors argue that there are two types of institutional traders: active traders such as hedge funds and passive traders 
such as pension funds. Active traders expend resources monitoring the status of the order whereas passive traders do 
not. Hence, the "picking-off" risk is relevant to some of the institutional investors and to all the individual investors. 
 
3 Handa et al. (2003) also show that the larger the excess market depth of the buy (sell) side relative to the market 
depth of the sell (buy) side, the higher the execution risk to buyers (sellers). Therefore, the larger the imbalance 
between the buy (sell) side relative to the sell (buy) side, the more likely buyers (sellers) are to use market orders 
rather than limit orders. 
 
4 The prediction of a positive relation between limit order submissions and the bid-ask spread is also consistent with 
Cohen et al.'s (1981) theoretical model, in which limit orders become more attractive as the bid-ask spread increases. 
and Caglio, 2005; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Ellul et al., 2007; Aitken et al., 2007b; Cao et 
al., 2008). Past research on the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is less 
conclusive. Bae et al. (2003), Ranaldo (2004) and Beber and Caglio (2005) document a 
positive relation between the placement of limit orders and volatility, as predicted by 
Foucault (1999).In contrast, Hasbrouck and Saar (2002), Wald and Horrigan (2005) and 
Aitken et al. (2007b) find that investors actually decrease the usage of limit orders 
relative to market orders when volatility increases. 
 
Prior literature also highlights that the order aggressiveness of investors might exhibit 
an intraday pattern. Harris (1998) suggests that liquidity and informed traders become 
more aggressive as the trading progresses due to the daily trading targets of liquidity 
traders and the revelation of informed traders' "information" at the end of the trading 
day. In an experimental study, Bloomfield et al. (2005) provide evidence that informed 
traders are more (less) aggressive early in the trading day (towards the end of the 
trading day). In contrast, uninformed investors are less aggressive early in the trading 
day and become more aggressive as the trading day comes to a close. Beber and Caglio 
(2005) offer empirical evidence supporting the prediction of Harris (1998) while Anand 
et al. (2005) and Ellul et al. (2007) document evidence consistent with the experimental 
finding of Bloomfield et al. (2005). 
 
Our paper contributes to the current literature by comparing the order aggressiveness 
of two different classes of investors, institutional and individual investors. While there 
are extensive empirical studies on the order choice or order aggressiveness of investors, 
few studies have made a distinction between institutional and individual investors' 
orders in their investigation of order aggressiveness. This distinction is important since 
these two classes of investors potentially differ in their possession of private 
information.5 Moreover, individual investors are also an important investment group in 
Australia; with 55% of the adult Australian population owning shares. In terms of 
market value, individual investors possess at least 22% of the Australian equity market 
and their trading activities account for about 51% of the market turnover as measured 
by the number of transactions (D'Aloisio, 2005). 
 
To the best of our knowledge, Aitken et al. (2007a) and Aitken et al. (2007b) are the 
only studies that distinguish between institutional and individual investors' orders 
while analyzing order aggressiveness. The main focus of Aitken et al. (2007a) is to 
highlight the simultaneous supply of liquidity at multiple prices in the limit order book 
and to compare the aggressiveness in liquidity supply of proprietary trading desks and 
hedge funds with mutual funds, index funds and insurance companies. In other words, 
Aitken et al. (2007a) examine the aggressiveness of limit orders after they have already 
been submitted to the order book. We differ from their study by analyzing the factors 
affecting the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors at the time of 
order submissions. This includes the choice of limit orders and market (marketable 
limit) orders of institutional and individual investors. We also distinguish our study 
from Aitken et al.'s (2007b) by not only analyzing the factors affecting investors' order 
aggressiveness but also by highlighting whether these factors affect institutional and 
                                                                        
5 Szewczyk et al. (1992), Alangar et al. (1999) and Dennis and Weston (2001) find evidence that institutional 
investors are better informed than individual investors. Chakravarty (2001) documents that institutional 
medium-size orders have a signiicantly greater cumulative stock price impact than individual orders. Moreover, 
Anand et al. (2005) also show that institutional limit orders outperform retail limit orders 
individual investors' order aggressiveness in a similar fashion. The results of our study 
will enhance the understanding of the similarities as well as the differences in the 
supply and demand of liquidity of institutional and individual investors in order driven 
markets. 
 
Another contribution of our study is the examination of order aggressiveness of stocks 
based on firm size. We examine order placement strategies of institutional and 
individual traders for large, medium (mid) and small capitalization (cap) stocks. Order 
placement strategies of investors in small and mid cap stocks as compared to large cap 
stocks are likely to take into account two significant differences in their respective 
trading environments. First, sophisticated investors, such as hedge funds, have 
incentives to expend more effort in monitoring large cap stocks as compared to mid and 
small cap stocks (Aitken et al. 2007a). Thus, the "picking-off" risk is exacerbated for 
large stocks as compared to mid and small cap stocks. Second, the non-execution risk is 
larger for mid cap and small cap stocks as compared to large stocks due to a lower rate 
of arrival of market orders. These factors will tend to alter the order placement 
behavior of institutional and individual investors. Our motivation in focusing on firm 
size is to enhance the cross-sectional generalizability of our results. 
 
We examine the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors for 30 
large cap, 30 mid cap and 30 small cap stocks traded on the ASX between 1 August 2005 
and 25 November 2005. Consistent with prior literature, we find the order 
aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors to be positively (negatively) 
related to the same-side (opposite-side) market depth. We conclude that both 
institutional and individual investors take execution probability into account while 
placing orders. In addition, we also document a negative relation between order 
aggressiveness and the bid-ask spread, especially in large cap stocks. Furthermore, we 
provide evidence indicating that institutional traders place more aggressive orders in 
highly volatile markets ostensibly to "pick-off" stale limit orders. Since monitoring is 
lower and transaction costs are higher for mid cap and small cap stocks, investors 
become less aggressive in trading these stocks when volatility increases. 
 
We also observe an intraday pattern for order aggressiveness with institutional 
investors being more aggressive during the first trading hour, and individual investors 
being less aggressive early in the day and tending to increase their order aggressiveness 
as the end of the trading day approaches. In addition, institutional and individual 
investors are more aggressive when submitting large orders, with the exception of 
institutional investors for small cap stocks. Institutional (individual) investors are also 
more (less) aggressive in their selling activities than in their buying activities in large 
and mid cap stocks. Both groups of investors are more aggressive in their selling 
activities in small cap stocks. We also document different responses of individual buyers 
and sellers to the changes in spread in mid cap stocks. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data to be used in 
the study and Section 3 explains the research methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
results and implications while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
2. Data 
We investigate the determinants of order aggressiveness for 30 large cap, 30 mid cap 
and 30 small cap stocks traded on the ASX between 1 August 2005 and 25 November 
2005. The sample ends on 25 November 2005 to avoid the impact of anonymous trading 
on the ASX, which starts from 28 November 2005.6 
 
The selection criteria for the stocks under investigation include both the stock market 
capitalization and trading activity. First, we consider only seasoned common stocks so 
all the unit trusts, preference shares and stocks with less than 3 years of trading history 
are excluded from the sample. Second, we require that all the stocks under investigation 
must be included in the S&P/ASX 200 index on 29 July 2005 (the day before our sample 
period) and 25 November 2005 (the end of the sample period). The choice of the S&P/ 
ASX 200 index ensures the representation of large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks as 
well as the institutional trading interest and the liquidity of the stocks under 
investigation. Consistent with the classification of the ASX, large cap stocks are defined 
as the stocks included in the S&P/ASX 50 index. The mid cap stocks are defined as the 
stocks included in the S&P/ASX 100 index but not in the S&P/ASX 50 index while the 
stocks included in S&P/ASX 200 index but not in the S&P/ASX 100 index represent our 
universe of small cap stocks. Third, we rank all large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks 
based on the daily average number of trades for the three-month period (May to July 
2005) before our sample period. The chosen 30 large cap stocks and 30 small cap stocks 
are the 30 most traded large cap stocks and the 30 least traded small cap stocks, based 
on the daily average number of trades between May and July 2005, respectively. We 
choose 30 mid cap stocks by drawing 15 stocks above and 15 stocks below the stock 
with the median daily average number of trades for the period between May and July 
2005. 
 
We obtain two different datasets from the Securities Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) for the investigation of the order aggressiveness of institutional 
and individual investors. The first dataset is the proprietary Order Book Dataset which 
records details on each order, including the order type (order submission, order 
revision, order cancellation and execution), the date and time to the nearest hundredth 
of a second, stock code, order price, order volume and order direction (buy or sell 
order). Each new order is assigned a unique identification number (ID) so that we can 
track the order from its submission through to any revision, cancellation or execution. A 
unique feature of this dataset is the provision of the confidential dummy variable, which 
indicates whether the order is submitted by an institutional or individual investor. 
The second dataset is the Market Depth Dataset, also provided by SIRCA, which contains 
information on the market depth of a particular stock. Specifically, it details the 10 best 
limit prices on the bid and ask side, in association with the total volume (number of 
shares) and the total number of orders at each price level. 
 
                                                                        
6 From 28 November 2005, brokers can no longer observe the identiication (IDs) of other brokers submitting orders 
in the ASX. Prior to this change, brokers have been able to identify, in real-time the broker number associated with 
every order (the broker IDs) in the central limit order book for each security traded on the ASX (Australian Stock 
Exchange, 2005). Australian Stock Exchange (2003,2005) discusses the reasons behind the removal of broker IDs on 
the ASX. Empirical findings on the impact of anonymity on market quality are documented in Comerton-Forde et al. 
(2005), Foucault et al. (2007) and Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009). 
 
This dataset is updated whenever there is a change to the price and/or volume to any of 
these 10 best limit prices. We remove all the observations in the Market Depth Dataset 
whenever the bid price is greater than the ask price at any of the 10 limit price levels. 
We also exclude all observations where the bid (ask) prices are not in strict descending 
(ascending) order from the first to the tenth best prices. 
 
For our purpose of comparing the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual 
investors, we match the Order Book Dataset to the Market Depth Dataset. Thus, we 
arrive at a final dataset that contains detailed information on every institutional or 
individual order submitted, revised or cancelled together with the market depth 
information at the time of order submission, revision or cancellation. In this study, only 
the orders submitted in the continuous trading session (from 10:10 to 16:00)7are 
included. In addition, we only analyze standard orders, so that crossing orders, All or 
Nothing orders and Fill and Kill orders are excluded.8 
 
In the current study, the confidential classification of institutional and individual orders 
is provided on an aggregated basis by SIRCA, after the approval to release confidential 
data from the ASX. For robustness check, we also perform an independent test for the 
ASX's classification of institutional and individual orders based on a trade-by-trade data 
from IRESS. This dataset identifies the transaction date and time, transaction price, 
trading volume, trade direction (whether the transaction is initiated by a buyer or 
seller) and most importantly the identity of the buying and selling brokers involved in 
the transactions. During our sample period, there are 89 brokers identified by the IRESS 
data, with 79 brokers participating in trading activity of the stocks considered in this 
robustness test. We classify the brokers into brokers dealing with institutional 
investors, with individual investors and with both groups of investors.9 From the IRESS 
data, we focus only on the transactions that have the buying broker or selling broker 
classified as doing business with either institutional or individual investors. From the 
Order Book Dataset provided by the ASX, we can identify for every transaction, whether 
the buyer and seller is an institution or an individual, as classified by the ASX. We then 
compare the ASX classification of institutions and individuals with our classification 
based on brokers' identities provided by IRESS. For the five randomly chosen large cap 
stocks, five randomly chosen mid cap stocks and five randomly chosen small cap stocks, 
we obtain a consistency of at least 98.62% in the institutional/individual orders 
classification.10 
 
                                                                        
7 7 Since the ASX's staggered opening procedure takes up to 10 minutes to complete, the data for the first 10 minutes 
of each day are excluded from our sample, to avoid any potential bias. 
 
8 If an investor submits an All or Nothing order, he/she instructs the order to be filled in full, otherwise the order is 
cancelled. In contrast, if an investor places a Fill and Kill order, his/her intention is to fill the order as much as 
possible and the unexecuted part will be cancelled. 
 
9 This classification is based on the brokers' names as well as on the description of the brokers' activities, services 
and products, provided on their websites and through telephone interviews. 
 
10 The results of this robustness check and the classification of brokers, where the brokers are identified based on the 
IRESS code, are available upon request. 
 
3. Research methodology 
Consistent with Biais et al. (1995), we classify orders into six levels of order 
aggressiveness. Category 1, the most aggressive orders, are buy (sell) orders with prices 
greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote and the size of the orders exceeds the 
market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. These orders are executed against the volume 
at the ask (bid) and in part against the market depth available higher (lower) in the 
book up to the order price. The unfilled portion of the order enters as a limit order in 
the order book. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask 
(bid) quote and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. 
These orders are executed immediately and the unfilled portion of the order becomes a 
limit order at that price in the limit order book. Category 3 orders are orders with price 
equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the 
opposite best quote. These orders are executed immediately and in full. Category 4 and 
5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 
orders are the least aggressive, in the sense that they are buy (sell) orders with prices 
less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. Based on this classification, Categories 1, 2 
and 3 can be classified as market orders, since they result in immediate execution,11 
while Category 4, 5 and 6 orders are limit orders as they are not executed immediately. 
These orders stand in the limit orders book, waiting for execution. 
 
Building on Griffiths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2004), the determinants of institutional 
and individual investors' order aggressiveness are investigated based on the ordered 
probit model. Consistent with Biais et al. (1995), the dependent variable - the order 
aggressiveness - is classified into one of the six levels. The explanatory variables include 
the same-side market depth, the opposite-side market depth, the relative bid-ask 
spread, volatility, the order size and two dummy variables, one for the first trading hour 
and one for sell orders. The same-side (opposite-side) market depth is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in terms of the 
number of shares, at the time of order submission. The relative bid-ask spread is the 
percentage of the bid-ask spread over the bid-ask mid-point, at the time of the order 
submission. Following Ranaldo (2004), volatility is defined as the standard deviation of 
the 20 most recent mid-quote returns multiplied by 100. The order size is the natural 
logarithm of the number of shares in a particular order. 
 
Besides spread, market depth and volatility, we include a dummy variable for the first 
trading hour to examine the potential differences in the order aggressiveness of 
institutional and individual investors in the early part of the trading day, as suggested 
by Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Anand et al. (2005). The dummy variable for sell orders 
is included to control for potential asymmetry between buy and sell orders, as 
documented by Ranaldo (2004). Order size is also incorporated in the ordered probit 
regression to examine the relation between order size and its aggressiveness. In order 
to highlight the potentially different impact that an explanatory variable might have on 
the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors, the ordered probit 
model is estimated separately for institutional and individual orders. We also perform 
the analysis of the institutional and individual investors' order aggressiveness for the 
                                                                        
11 Since all orders on the ASX are priced, Category 1, 2 and 3 orders should be classified as marketable limit orders. In 
the current paper, we refer to them as market orders for brevity. 
 
buy orders and sell orders separately to highlight the potential differences in the 
determinants of the order aggressiveness of buyers and sellers. 
 
In this study, we investigate the determinants of institutional and individual order 
aggressiveness based on new order submissions and order revisions. Ranaldo (2004) 
investigates order aggressiveness with order cancellations classified as the least 
aggressive type of orders. Pascual and Veredas (2004) and Hall and Hautsch (2006) 
provide discussion for the need to model order submissions and order cancellations 
differently. In our sample period, 25.70% of all orders are subsequently cancelled and 
order cancellation accounts for 16.11% of all new order submissions, order revisions 
and order cancellations. We examine order aggressiveness without order cancellations 
and with order cancellations classified as the least aggressive orders, as in Ranaldo 
(2004). The results in both cases are qualitatively the same. Therefore, we only report 
the results without order cancellations in this study.12 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Statistics of order submissions 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the orders submitted for the 90 stocks under 
investigation. In total, we investigate 7,210,868 orders, including 3,079,243 orders 
submitted by institutional investors and 4,131,625 orders submitted by individual 
investors. Similar to Aitken et al. (2007b), Category 5 orders are the most common 
order type for institutional investors, while the most common order type for individual 
investors is Category 6 orders. In addition, consistent with Parlour (1998) and Handa et 
al. (2003), both institutional and individual investors tend to submit aggressive 
(market) orders when the same-side market depth is higher than the opposite-side 
market depth. For both institutional and individual investors, the relative bid-ask 
spread is also higher at the time of limit order submissions than at the time of market 
order submissions. These observations present early support for the effect of the spread 
and market depth on order aggressiveness. 
 
 
4.2. The distribution of order aggressiveness levels 
Table 2 provides information regarding the distribution of order aggressiveness levels 
over the course of the trading day. In the current study, we partition the trading day 
into six intervals: 10:10-11:00, 11:0012:00,12:00-13:00,13:00-14:00,14:00-15:00 and 
15:00-16:00.
                                                                        
12 The results with order cancellations can be provided upon request. For more discussion on order cancellations on 
the ASX, see Liu (2009). 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of order submissions. 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the order submissions of institutional and individual investors in this study. 
The sample period is between 1 August 2005 and 25 November 2005. Following Biais et al. (1995), orders are 
classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices greater (less) than the 
best ask (bid) quote and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are 
buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than the market depth at the 
best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less 
volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the 
prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid 
(ask) quotes. "Frequency" is the number of orders submitted at a particular aggressiveness level."% of all orders" is 
the percentage of the number of orders in a particular order aggressiveness level over all orders. "Order size" is the 
average number of shares submitted in an order. "Depth at best same (opposite) " is the average number of shares at 
the best same-side (opposite-site) quote at the time of order submission. "Depth at same (opposite)" is the average 
number of shares at the 10 best same-side (opposite-side) quote at the time of order submission. "Relative spread" is 
the average relative spread, which is calculated as the percentage of the bid-ask spread over the bid-ask midpoint, at 
the time of the order submission. "Volatility" is the average volatility, which is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the most recent 20 mid-quote returns at the time of order submission multiplied by 100. 
 
 
Table 2 
The distribution of order aggressiveness levels over the trading day. 
 
 
This table presents the distribution of the order aggressiveness level over the trading day. Following Biais et al. 
(1995), orders are classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices 
greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. 
Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than 
the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote 
and demand less volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders 
within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) 
than the best bid (ask) quotes. Orders with aggressiveness levels from 1 to 3 are market orders and orders with 
aggressiveness levels from 4 to 6 are limit orders. The trading day is divided into six intervals: 
10:10-11:00,11:00-12:00,12:00-13:00, 13:00-14:00,14:00-15:00 and 15:00-16:00. "MO" ("LO") refers to the total 
number of market (limit) orders in a particular interval. "Total" is the total number of orders submitted in a 
particular interval. "%MO" ("%LO") is the percentage of market(limit) orders out of all orders submitted in a 
particular interval. 
 
 
From Table 2, we observe that the order aggressiveness of institutional investors has a 
U-shaped pattern. Institutional investors are more aggressive and demand more 
liquidity (place more market orders) early on in the trading day than in other intervals. 
As the trading day progresses, institutional investors become less aggressive and 
submit fewer market orders and more limit orders. However, towards the end of the 
trading day, institutional investors increase their order aggressiveness, but their order 
aggressiveness at the end of the trading day is not as high as it is at the beginning of the 
trading day. Individual investors behave in an opposite fashion; they are less aggressive 
early on in the day and become more aggressive as the end of the trading day 
approaches. 
 
4.3. The order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors 
Table 3 presents the results of investigating the determinants of order aggressiveness 
for institutional and individual investors. Since the aggressiveness levels are ranked 
from 1 (the most aggressive) to 6 (the least aggressive), a negative coefficient indicates 
a positive relation between the explanatory variable and investors' order 
aggressiveness. 
 
Table 3 
The determinants of institutional and individual order aggressiveness. 
 
 
From Table 3, we observe a positive (negative) and significant relation between the 
same-side (opposite-side) market depth and order aggressiveness in the majority of 
stocks. These results are consistent for both institutional and individual investors' 
orders and provide support for the effect of market depth on order aggressiveness. Both 
institutional and individual investors tend to submit more aggressive orders when the 
same-side market depth increases or when the opposite-side market depth decreases. 
In contrast, investors tend to submit less aggressive orders when the same-side market 
depth decreases or when the opposite-side market depth increases. 
 
We also find that the majority of the coefficients for the bid-ask spread are positive and 
significant for institutional investors' orders. This evidence supports a negative relation 
between the order aggressiveness of institutional investors and the bid-ask spread. The 
order aggressiveness of individual investors is also negatively related to the bid-ask 
spread, especially in large cap stocks. In mid cap stocks, individual investors tend to 
submit more aggressive orders when the spread widens. This finding indicates that the 
execution risk is a significant factor for mid cap stocks. Thus, individual investors place 
more aggressive orders when the spread widens while trading mid cap stocks as 
compared to large cap stocks. 
 
The finding for the effect of volatility on institutional and individual investors' order 
aggressiveness varies across stocks. We observe a negative relation between the order 
aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors and volatility in mid cap stocks. 
In contrast, a positive relation between institutional investors' order aggressiveness 
and volatility is documented in large cap stocks. The relation between order 
aggressiveness and volatility is insignificant in the majority of small cap stocks for both 
institutional and individual investors.13 Since higher volatility implies greater a 
"picking-off risk (Foucault, 1999) and institutions often monitor the limit order book 
more closely (AAHM), we can expect greater "picking-off" activity by institutions when 
volatility increases. Because monitoring is lower for mid and small cap stocks (Liu, 
2009), the increase in "picking-off" activity by institutions should be more prevalent in 
large cap stocks. This argument is supported by our finding that institutions become 
more aggressive when volatility increases in large cap stocks. 
 
We also document that institutional and individual investors adopt different order 
submission strategies in the first hour of the trading day. For institutional investors, 
negative and significant coefficient estimates for the dummy variable for the first 
trading hour are observed for the majority of large and mid cap stocks under 
investigation. This implies that institutional investors are more aggressive and demand 
liquidity in the first hour of the trading day. In contrast, for individual orders, the 
coefficient estimates for the dummy variable for the first trading hour tend to be 
positive and significant, especially in large cap stocks. This result indicates that 
individual investors are less aggressive and use more limit orders during the first 
trading hour. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
13 Consistent with Ranaldo (2004), we also examine volatility in a separate regression, or calculate volatility based on 
the standard deviation of the most recent 10 and 30 mid-quote returns. The results of these investigations are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the current study. 
 
  
With regard to the relation between order size and order aggressiveness, the results in 
Table 3 indicate that institutional and individual investors tend to increase their order 
aggressiveness when submitting large orders for large and mid cap stocks. For small cap 
stocks, institutional (individual) investors are less (more) aggressive when they submit 
a large order. 
 
Finally, the results in Table 3 show that institutional investors' sell orders are more 
aggressive than their buy orders in large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks. In contrast, 
individual investors' sell orders are less aggressive than individual buy orders in large 
and mid cap stocks. In small cap stocks, the sell orders of individual investors are more 
aggressive than their buy orders. 
 
4.4. The order aggressiveness of buy and sell orders 
We investigate the order aggressiveness of institutional investors' buy and sell orders in 
Table 4. We observe consistent results regarding the opposite-side market depth, the 
bid-ask spread and volatility for both buy and sell orders. In addition, in large cap and 
mid cap stocks, the majority of the coefficient estimates for the dummy variable for the 
first trading hour are negative and significant, which indicates that institutional 
investors tend to be more aggressive early on in the trading day in their buying and 
selling activities. Institutional investors are also more aggressive in their selling 
activities when the same-side market depth increases in all three groups of stocks while 
there is no clear-cut evidence for the impact of same-side market depth on institutional 
buying activities in mid cap stocks. 
 
Table 4 
The determinants of institutional buy and sell order aggressiveness. 
 
 
 
The results of investigating the order aggressiveness of individual investors' buy and 
sell orders are given in Table 5. For individual investors, the buy and sell order 
aggressiveness are positively (negatively) related to the same-side market depth (the 
opposite-side market depth) and the order size. In addition, the results in Panel B of 
Table 5 indicate that the majority of the coefficient estimates for the dummy variable 
for the first trading hour in large cap stocks are positive and significant. This finding 
suggests that individual investors are less aggressive in their selling activities early on 
in the trading day. The most significant difference between buy and sell orders for 
individual investors is observed in the effect of spread on order aggressiveness in mid 
cap stocks. In mid cap stocks, when the spread increases, individual investors tend to 
submit less aggressive buy orders but more aggressive sell orders. 
 
Table 5 
The determinants of individual buy and sell order aggressiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5. Implication of results 
Overall, consistent with prior theoretical and empirical literature,14 we find strong 
evidence that institutional and individual order aggressiveness are positively related to 
the same-side market depth and negatively related to the opposite-side market depth. 
Market depth can be viewed as a proxy for the execution probability and thus will affect 
investors' order aggressiveness. When the same-side market depth increases, the 
execution probability of the incoming limit order is reduced. Therefore, investors are 
more likely to submit more aggressive orders to obtain higher execution priority in the 
                                                                        
14 See for example, Biais et al. (1995), Parlour (1998), Griffiths et al. (2000), Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), 
Hall and Hautsch (2006), Ellul et al. (2007), Aitken et al. (2007b) and Cao et al. (2008). 
 
book. In contrast, an increase in the market depth on the buy (sell) side increases the 
execution probability of limit orders on the sell (buy) side. This reduces the 
non-execution risk for limit orders and therefore, investors may prefer limit orders over 
market orders when the opposite-side market depth increases. 
 
Our empirical results regarding the impact of bid-ask spread on order aggressiveness 
supports a negative relation between order aggressiveness and the bid-ask spread. Both 
institutional and individual investors submit less aggressive orders when spreads tend 
to be high. Individual investors submit more aggressive orders in mid cap stocks as 
compared to large cap stocks when the spread widens. This finding implies that 
non-execution risk is a significant factor for individual investors while trading mid cap 
stocks. Individual investors differ from institutional investors in their timely knowledge 
of the order book. This informational disadvantage induces them to place more 
aggressive orders even when the spread is high for mid cap stocks. 
 
Our finding regarding the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness suggests a negative 
relation between order aggressiveness and volatility in mid cap stocks. This is 
consistent with the prediction of the Foucault (1999) model. In large cap stocks, we 
document a positive relation between institutional investors' order aggressiveness and 
volatility. Consistent with Foucault (1999), we argue that increases in volatility imply 
greater "picking-off" risk for limit order submitters. In addition, AAHM suggest that 
since institutional investors often pay higher fees for more continuous monitoring of the 
state of the limit order book, the "picking-off" risk is more applicable to individual 
investors. Therefore, institutional investors have incentives to incur higher monitoring 
costs and place aggressive orders when volatility increases in order to profit from 
"picking-off" stale limit orders. Since monitoring is lower for mid and small cap stocks 
(Liu, 2009) and the transaction costs are higher for those stocks compared to large cap 
stocks, it is much more difficult and less profitable for institutional investors to adopt 
this trading strategy in mid and small cap stocks. Thus, we observe a positive relation 
between volatility and order aggressiveness for institutional investors in large cap 
stocks but not in mid cap and small cap stocks. A positive relation between order 
aggressiveness and volatility for institutional investors is consistent with the notion that 
institutional investors monitor the limit order book more closely and "pick-off" stale 
limit orders when volatility increases.15 
 
The results in Table 2 and the results regarding the dummy variable for the first trading 
hour presented in Table 3 also indicate that institutional investors and individual 
investors in our study follow a different order submission pattern over the trading day. 
Institutional investors are potentially better-informed, they submit more aggressive 
orders early on in the trading day when information asymmetry is high and prices have 
not converged to their true value. As trading progresses and information is 
incorporated into prices, institutional investors switch t16o using limit orders and 
                                                                        
15 The "picking-off" activities are more likely to originate from active institutions such as hedge funds and proprietary 
trading desks rather than mutual funds and insurance companies (AAHM). 
 
16 See for example, Szewczyketal. (1992), Alangaretal. (1999), Dennis and Weston (2001), Chakravarty (2001) and 
Anandetal. (2005). 
 
provide liquidity to the market. This pattern in the order submissions of institutional 
investors is consistent with the experimental findings of the informed traders' order 
submission pattern as documented in Bloomfield et al. (2005). However, in contrast to 
Bloomfield et al. (2005), institutional investors increase their order aggressiveness 
towards the end of the day. Individual investors behave in the opposite direction to 
institutional investors; they are less aggressive early on in the trading day when 
information asymmetry and the "picking-off" risk are high. As trading progresses, 
individual investors become more aggressive in their order submissions, especially 
when the trading expiration approaches. The increase in order aggressiveness of 
institutional and individual investors towards the end of the trading day is consistent 
with Harris's (1998) prediction. Institutional and individual investors appear to have 
daily trading targets and they become more aggressive towards the end of the trading 
day to achieve their trading targets. 
 
Our findings in Table 3 indicate that institutional investors tend to increase their order 
aggressiveness when submitting large orders. Many large orders are information 
driven. This is because in markets with pre-trade transparency, institutions would like 
to prevent front-running when they place large limit orders. In contrast, in small cap 
stocks, institutional investors are often less aggressive when they submit a large order. 
This is because there is less monitoring by other institutional investors and therefore 
lower risk of front-running. Individual investors in general are less likely to trade, 
seeking to exploit private information. Thus, they are less likely to be exposed to the 
risk of front-running. Therefore, we observe consistent results for the relation between 
order size and order aggressiveness for individual investors. 
 
The evidence documented in Table 4 suggests that in large cap stocks, institutional 
investors are more aggressive in their buying activities than in their selling activities 
when volatility increases. In addition, institutions are more aggressive in their buying 
activities than in their selling activities in the first hour of the trading day. Individual 
investors are also less aggressive in their selling activities than in their buying activities 
in the first trading hour, especially in large cap stocks. These results indicate that if the 
order submissions of institutions and individuals in the first trading hour or in reaction 
to changes in volatility in large cap stocks can be explained by the information 
advantage institutions have over individuals, institutional buy orders are likely to be 
more informative than institutional sell orders. This finding is consistent with prior 
empirical evidence that buy orders are more likely to be motivated by information than 
sell orders (see, for example, Griffiths et al., 2000 and Ranaldo, 2004). Individual 
investors also display more aggressive selling behavior as compared to buying behavior 
when the bid-ask spread widens in mid cap stocks. It appears that they are less sensitive 
to transaction costs while selling but are more concerned with non-execution risk. 
 
The economic theory of capacity-constrained pricing and congestion-based premiums 
suggest that higher trading volume and excess buying or selling pressure over market 
depth at the ask or bid quote can result in an increase in the ask quote and a decrease in 
the bid quote, which subsequently leads to wider spread.17 Higher trading volume can 
also reduce non-execution risk and thus make orders less aggressive. Thus, these 
                                                                        
17 See Harris et al. (1995) for a discussion and test of this theory. 
 
arguments can also explain the effect of bid-ask spread on investors' order 
aggressiveness. Harris and McInish (2000) also suggest that these arguments are 
separate for buy-side regimes and sell-side regimes. Therefore, a question for future 
research is why do individual buyers' and sellers' respond differently to changes in 
spread for mid cap stocks while they respond in a similar manner for large cap stocks. 
Furthermore, why is this difference more apparent for individual buyers and sellers 
than institutional buyers and sellers?18 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the determinants of the order aggressiveness of institutional 
and individual investors on the ASX. We report strong evidence that the order 
aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors is positively related to 
same-side market depth and negatively related to opposite-side market depth. These 
findings indicate that traders consider non-execution risk while deciding on their order 
placement strategy. Both individual and institutional traders submit less aggressive 
orders when spreads are high while trading large cap stocks. However, individual 
investors switch to a more aggressive strategy while trading mid cap stocks even if 
spreads are wide. We ascribe this critical difference between individual and 
institutional traders to their sensitivity to non-execution risk. Individual investors are at 
an informational disadvantage with respect to their timely knowledge of the order book 
as compared to institutional investors and hence alter their strategy to cope with 
non-execution. 
 
Furthermore, institutional investors place more aggressive orders under volatile market 
conditions in order to profit from "picking-off" stale limit orders. As monitoring is lower 
and transaction costs are higher for mid cap and small cap stocks, traders are less 
aggressive in their order placement when volatility increases in these stocks. 
Institutional and individual investors follow different order placement strategies at the 
beginning of the trading day. Whereas institutional traders place more aggressive 
orders early in the trading day to exploit potential short-lived information, their 
individual counterparts are less aggressive initially and become more aggressive as the 
trading day progresses. Institutional traders also place more aggressive sell orders as 
compared to buy orders. This finding implies that their perceived opportunity costs of 
not selling exceed the costs of not buying. We believe that our research is potentially 
useful to traders, policy makers and fund managers. Further research on explicit 
measurement of trading costs during different phases of the market is likely to be 
valuable to both practitioners and policy makers. 
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